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RETRACING AUGUSTINE’S ETHICS
Lying, Necessity, and the Image of God
Matthew Puffer
ABSTRACT
Augustine’s exposition of the image of God in Book 15 of On The Trinity (De
Trinitate) sheds light on multiple issues that arise in scholarly interpretations of
Augustine’s account of lying. This essay argues against interpretations that posit a uniform account of lying in Augustine—with the same constitutive features,
and insisting both that it is never necessary to tell a lie and that lying is absolutely prohibited. Such interpretations regularly employ intertextual reading
strategies that elide distinctions and developments in Augustine’s ethics of lying.
Instead, I show how looking at texts written prior and subsequent to the texts
usually consulted suggests a trajectory in Augustine’s thought, beginning with
an understanding of lies as morally culpable but potentially necessary, and culminating in a vision of lying as the fundamental evil and the origin of every sin.
KEY WORDS:

Augustine, lying, necessity, image of God, interpretation, Trinity

Is it ever necessary to tell a lie—perhaps to save a human life, to bring
about someone’s eternal salvation, or to fulfill the role-specific duties of
one’s public office? The broad consensus among scholars is that Augustine’s consistent answer to this question is “No.” Regardless of the circumstances, and contrary to occasional scholarly objections and minority
reports, Augustine’s position is that all lies are sins, and therefore one
should never tell a lie.
In what follows, I explore how the image of God gives shape to Augustine’s moral reasoning about lying.1 My contention is not simply that the
image of God holds explanatory power for understanding Augustine’s
ethics, but also that this doctrine serves to illuminate three distinct but
interrelated interpretive concerns with applications beyond Augustine and
the test case of lying. I treat the first concern, the hermeneutics of familiarization and defamiliarization, in conversation with John Bowlin’s and Paul
1

The use of “moral reasoning” throughout this essay is informed by recent comparative
religious ethics literature that explores patterns or frames of “normative reasoning” or
“practical reasoning” that give rise to moral judgments and to which appeals are made in
justifying these judgments (see Kelsay 2010, 228; 2012, 585, 593–94).
Matthew Puffer is Assistant Professor of Humanities and Ethics at Valparaiso University.
Matthew Puffer, matthew.puffer@valpo.edu.
C 2016 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.
JRE 44.4:685–720. V
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Griffiths’s writings on Augustine’s ethics of lying and coercion. The disagreement here has to do with the proximity of contemporary readers to
Augustine with respect to philosophical and theological premises, forms of
moral inquiry, and ethical judgments. A second line of inquiry asks about
formal similarities between lying and killing as understood by Augustine
and by religious ethicists today, specifically whether they are analogous or
disanalogous acts, and in what respects. Contra Alain Epp Weaver and
David Decosimo, I argue that due to his theological commitments regarding the image of God, Augustine neither does nor should treat lying and
killing as morally analogous acts. The third concern explores whether an
intertextual-canonical or a genetic-historical reading method is more
appropriate for interpreting Augustine’s ethics of lying. After outlining the
standard interpretation of Augustine’s ethics of lying, I examine his earliest and final writings on the topic as two vistas from which to view and
appreciate developments regarding the definition of lying, its potential
necessity, and the central role that lying plays in the genesis of evil.

1. In the Beginning of Evil Was the Lie
The question of lying gets at the very core of Augustine’s theology,
since it has implications for understanding his doctrines of God, the
Trinity, Christology, soteriology, and humanity. There is no ethical issue
more intimately tied to these theological loci than that of lying. The reasons for this have to do with his account of the act of lying and the
unique way this act draws upon the twin functions of the image of the
Trinity in the rational soul. Killing, torture, and coercive violence are
acts that involve natural evils and violence, both resulting from and
necessitated by original and inherited sin. While Augustine is clear that
killing, torture, and coercive violence are lamentable and miserable but
sometimes necessary acts—for they are not moral evils in and of themselves—he insists that lying is never necessary. “No one can prove that
at times a lie is necessary” (mend. 7.10).2 Particularly in Augustine’s
mature theology and ethics, lying becomes the fundamental moral evil.
It is the act by which the mind turns away from the summum bonum,
and voluntarily reorients its attention toward lesser created goods without reference to their Creator. This is the original sin of Lucifer, the
Father of Lies, and the original sin of the first humans. It is the origin
of the schism between the heavenly and earthly cities and remains the
essential, enduring feature of the latter. In each origin, and ever since, it
is the sin of lying that has been at the root of every other sinful work.
2

I have used, and on occasion slightly emended, the translations that appear in the reference list. See Abbreviations (at the end of the essay before the References section) for
Latin titles, dates, and English translations of Augustine’s texts.
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The lie is the original evil that gives rise to all other evils. In the beginning of evil was the lie.
If we are to understand Augustine’s ethics we will have to attend to
the meaning he gives to lying—the reasons for his view of it as the primal evil act, the original human sin, and the source of every subsequent
sin in human history. We will also want to consider the implications for
political existence amidst the two entangled cities and the necessities of
their life together in the saeculum.3 In order to understand how Christians ought to engage in civic life during the shared journey of the two cities, Augustine thinks we will need to consider the lies of the demons
before the creation of the human.4 As James Wetzel observes, Augustine
identifies lying as foundational to the civitas terrena, alien to the civitas
dei, and essential to understanding the permixtum, civitas saeculi.
Each of the two cities, then, is a mixed bag of natures, fleshy and fleshless,
but a distinctive unity of will. Angels and saints in chorus will the good for
God’s sake; demons and their human minions work publicly for worldly glory, while privately serving the good of their separate and endlessly dissipating selves, for theirs is the unity of a common lie. Opposing orientations of
will, one true, the other false, is what counts for Augustine as the defining
difference between two mixed-natured cities, both angelic and human, but
as different as day and night. (Wetzel 2012, 12)

It is an orientation of will on which the true or false nature of one’s
eschatological residence turns. The opposition of the two cities and the
lie held in common by the reprobate, the demons, and the Father of Lies
leads to questions about moral psychology and, for Augustine, the image
of God.
The image of God is integral to Augustine’s ethics of lying and to
understanding the evils and sufferings afflicting the citizens of both cities in the saeculum. And yet, this claim is not borne out either by Augustine’s first six major writings on lying or by secondary scholarship on
Augustine’s ethics of lying. A major reason for this is that Augustine
never mentions the image of God in the vast majority of his discussions
of lying.5 Not until Book 15 of De Trinitate (c. 426), Augustine’s final
3

The Latin saeculum, from which the English “secular” derives, denotes for Augustine a
particular span of time that began at Christ’s ascension to heaven and will continue until
Christ’s second coming.
4
See civ. 11.13–15. It is not sufficient to begin an inquiry into Augustine’s political theology at De civitate Dei 19 if the aim is to understand the commitments and motivations that
form its descriptions and prescriptions offered so late in his oeuvre in general and in De
civitate Dei in particular. We will need to examine those texts that explore the role of the
lie in the rational soul, its distorting role in all human action, and its implications for the
good life and the common good.
5
The image of God is never mentioned in en. Ps. 5.7, s. Dom. mon. 5.37, mend., ep. 82,
c. mend., or ench. 6–7.
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foray into the dynamics of deceit, do the ethics of lying and the account
of the image of God finally converge. Because De Trinitate 15 rarely
serves as a source for interpretations of Augustine’s ethics of lying, its
interpretive significance for related issues in Augustine’s theological
ethics is largely overlooked.

2. Three Questions of Interpretation
2.1 Familiarization or defamiliarization?: Augustine’s moral reasoning
and our own
Augustine’s staunchest critics and most sympathetic readers alike find
his ethics vexing. Lying and coercion are two of the more perplexing
topics to which Augustine scholars and ethicists regularly turn, and proposals for rehabilitating or reconciling his seemingly incommensurable
judgments are standard fare among scholars engaging his moral reasoning about lying and coercion (see, for example, Brinton 1983; Dodaro
1994; Weaver 2001; Johnson 2001; Decosimo 2010).
Regarding coercion, for example, John Bowlin observes that “many of
his critics suspect that he does not believe his own ‘threadbare arguments,’ or at the very least should not, given that his efforts to justify
coercion are inconsistent with his more settled views about virtue, freedom, and the limits of political authority in the saeculum” (Bowlin 1997,
54). And yet Bowlin suggests that if “we cannot imagine sharing Augustine’s conclusions about the use of coercion against religious dissent,”
then it is likely that we have misunderstood what Augustine is up to
(1997, 54). In an effort to make Augustine more comprehensible, Bowlin
directs attention away from the conclusions alien to modern readers and
highlights instead those features of Augustine’s context and his moral
reasoning with which readers might more readily identify. If we cannot
imagine consenting to his judgments about political and religious coercion, perhaps we are nevertheless quite close to him with respect to
forms of moral reasoning, basic dispositions, and aspirations. The advantage of such an approach is that it familiarizes Augustine. It forces us to
see ourselves as nearer to him, and he to us, in spite of his explicit judgments that might lead us to believe otherwise. According to Bowlin, by
virtue of a common human nature, we share with Augustine a collection
of reason-giving practices, capacities for moral discernment, and common
moral intuitions that make our judgments for the most part intelligible
to one another. Augustine’s moral reasoning largely resembles our own.
Griffiths’s strategy for reading Augustine’s ethics of lying is nearly the
opposite. His aim is not to show that Augustine’s ethics are commensurable with our natural or shared intuitions, practices, or inclinations, but
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rather to disclose just how alien his doctrinal commitments, moral grammar, and formative disciplines are from those taken for granted within a
consumerist and individualistic “late-capitalist democracy” (Griffiths
2004, 229). According to Griffiths, nearly everyone has
moral and practical intuitions that make the Augustinian ban on the lie
unacceptable and the reasons for the ban dubious. This will be true whether
or not you are a Christian: the distance between Augustine’s metaphysic and
ours is great; greater still would be the distance between a community that
took the Augustinian ban seriously—a community of truth—and the forms
of social, political, and economic life in which we live and move and have our
being. (Griffiths 2004, 226)

Griffiths’s goal is not to show the reader how Augustine’s moral reasoning is like ours, but to introduce the reader to Augustine’s moral vision
in a way that defamiliarizes for the reader her own context, enabling
taken-for-granted assumptions to come into view. He aims to explain to
the reader why she will remain inclined to disagree with Augustine,
even though Augustine is correct: “For those who are not Christians
already, such persuasion would require assent to a large number of
truths about God’s nature and the image of God in us, for Augustine
thinks that what he argues about the lie presupposes the truth of such
Christian convictions” (Griffiths 2004, 15). Indeed, Augustine’s position
regarding lying has proven unpersuasive not only to non-Christians, but
to most Christians as well (see Ramsey 1985). Griffiths puts quite a fine
point on the matter with a range of scenarios:
A million innocent lives against the lie. . . . Only Augustine would accept
the terms and ban the lie. The consistent Augustinian cannot lie to save
innocent life, whether one or a million. . . . Should I lie to save the life of my
child? No. Should I lie to prevent war, encourage peace, soothe the weary
and discouraged, instruct the foolish, or liberate the innocent from torture?
No. (Griffiths 2004, 230)

If Griffiths is right, then Augustine’s ethics that derive from the image
of God may well be at odds with the way in which many religious ethicists and human rights discourses today deploy the image of God and its
purported secular or public-reason analogue, human dignity.6
6

Consider Augustine’s potential response to J€
urgen Habermas, Nicholas Wolterstorff, or
Jeremy Waldron who offer three rival judgments regarding the image of God vis-
a-vis
human dignity and rights. Habermas claims that “the concept of ‘man in the image of God’
[translates] into that of the identical dignity of all men that deserves unconditional respect”
(Habermas and Ratzinger 2006, 45). Wolterstorff argues the image of God does not translate directly to human dignity nor does it establish human rights (Wolterstorff 2008, 342–
61). According to Waldron, the image of God “may not be appropriate as a ground for
human rights at all, or if it is looked to as a ground, it may make a considerable difference
to the character of the rights theory we erect on its foundation” (Waldron 2011, 216).
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Although Bowlin focuses on coercion and Griffiths writes about both lying
and coercion, comparing their modes of familiarization and defamiliarization
is instructive. For they share a common experience of finding Augustine initially perplexing and a common goal of making his ethics intelligible (if not
agreeable) to his readers today. Both scholars find interpreting Augustine’s
ethics less than straightforward and seek to explain them in light of his particular social and cultural context and philosophical and theological commitments, all of which require the difficult work of contextualization and
interpretation. In offering their explanations, however, Bowlin and Griffiths
devise different, and in important ways opposed, reading strategies. These
strategies help to illustrate how scholars arrive at disparate accounts of
Augustine’s ethics, at least in part due to the fact that their interpretations
tend either to civilize Augustine according to contemporary moral norms or
to make him alien to modern sensibilities. Readers of Bowlin and Griffiths
are challenged to discern whether Augustine’s ethics are largely our own or
represent instead a quite distinct mode of moral inquiry grounded in his doctrines of the Trinity and of the image of God. We begin to discern a possible
resolution to this quandary by examining the respects in which lying and
coercion are analogous and disanalogous acts according to Augustine’s moral
vision and the moral reasoning that informs his ethical judgments.7
7

Historical literature only adds to the reasons for consternation regarding Augustine’s
ethics as proposals for resolving alleged tensions or reconciling apparent inconsistencies.
For example, some forty years since Peter Brown’s epic biography and Robert Markus’s
Saeculum first appeared, both scholars have revisited and revised their widely influential
estimations of the brooding elderly bishop. Looking back at his masterpiece, Brown recognizes that in his interpretation of the mature Augustine—the “truly oppressive,” “severe
and aggressive figure of authority”—he had failed to appreciate “how little authority
Augustine actually wielded over his hearers” (Brown 2000, 446). Robert Dodaro and Brent
Shaw share Brown’s more recent appraisal of Augustine’s relative lack of influence over his
contemporaries (see Dodaro 2003; Shaw 2015). Recognition of such limits has led Brown,
with Dodaro and Shaw, to ascribe even greater importance to the role that rhetoric plays
as Augustine constructs arguments intended to move Roman political officials to wield their
power (see Dodaro 2004, 2005; Shaw 2011). Markus’s early estimation perceived Augustine’s proposals for ecclesial discipline as a “horrible doctrine” resulting from a tension
between his commitment to a desacralized political sphere and his advocacy of statesponsored coercion of religious dissent (Markus 1970, 142). More recently, Markus is less
sanguine about identifying the former trajectory of secularization that he had associated
with Augustine, including its conception of the secular that is particularly salutary to
“modern secular liberalism” (Markus 2006, 3, 12, 51–69). Brown and Markus have modified
their appraisals in part due to the discovery of letters and sermons that lend greater perspective on Augustine’s context, including a better understanding of to whom letters were
addressed and where their recipients stood in the Roman imperial hierarchy, and in part
due to a wave of scholarship that has generated significant advances in late-antique historiography. Predictably, ethics scholarship has evolved in conversation with Brown, Markus,
and historical studies such that recent interpretations of Augustine’s ethics challenge
aspects of his historical reception, including issues of coercion, rape, sexuality, and slavery
(see Lee 2016; Webb 2013; Larsen 2015; Conley 2015).
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2.2 Analogous or disanalogous acts? Lying and killing in Augustine’s
moral reasoning
Religious ethicists display a diversity of interpretations in their critical engagements with Augustine’s ethics of lying, on the one hand, and
his ethics of violent coercion, on the other. Some scholars perceive in
Augustine’s apparently absolute prohibition of lying an idealism that is
in tension with his judgments regarding political and religious coercion
that are often labeled as “Augustinian realism.” Predictably, responses to
this alleged tension depend greatly on the constructive purposes of a given reader.
Weaver, for example, embraces Augustine’s position on lying—interpreted as an absolute prohibition of a sinful act—and then applies that
reasoning to all acts of violence, including killing, both public and private. Augustine should have endorsed this pacifist position in order to
become consistent with his better insights (see Weaver 2001). Augustine
is wrong to arrive at the ethics of violence and killing that he does and,
for consistency’s sake, they ought to be revised and brought into agreement with his ethics of lying. The result, Weaver argues, is an authentically Augustinian prohibition of killing analogous to his absolute
prohibition of lying.8
Taking a very different approach, Decosimo asserts that Augustine’s
justification of killing, limited to those who hold the relevant public
office, provides a lens through which to perceive the ethics of lying that
Augustine truly held. He applies an early public/private distinction from
a discussion of self-defense in De libero arbitrio (ca. 388 CE) to his later
moral reasoning regarding lying, with the result that Augustine’s purported absolute prohibition of lying becomes analogous to a prohibition
of private killing in self-defense.9 According to Decosimo, lying by a public official is scarcely considered by Augustine, but we can discern what
Augustine would have written, and actually held to be the case, by
extrapolation.10 Decosimo argues that Augustine’s ethics of lying are
therefore analogous to his ethics of violent coercion: there is not an absolute prohibition of lying, as Augustine’s interpreters through the ages
have thought, but merely a prohibition of private lying. Lying, like killing, is sanctioned under certain conditions such as holding either the
8
Weaver’s argument bears formal resemblance to John Howard Yoder’s use of Karl
Barth’s ethics of capital punishment to critique his ethics of war (see Yoder 2003, 79n3).
9
See Decosimo 2010. This argument was anticipated though not prosecuted by John
Rist: “If [an offence to God] is Augustine’s concern, we may wonder whether official lying
might not be justified and accepted in a similar way to official killing” (Rist 1994, 195).
10
Like John Mark Mattox, Decosimo interprets Quaestionem in heptateuchem (qu.)
6.10–11 as an instance of justified lying by a military officer (see Mattox 2006, 64; Decosimo
2010, 13–24).
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legitimate authority of a public magistrate or the requisite subordinate
office.11
Although their arguments run counter to one another, Weaver and
Decosimo share a common aim: identifying an authentically Augustinian
ethic that incorporates into a single framework his seemingly divergent
ethics of lying and killing in war. And they share a basic assumption,
namely that Augustine’s ethics of lying and his ethics of violent coercion
ought to be understood as formally similar. Lying and violent coercion
should be evaluated as morally analogous acts, and the moral judgment
that applies to one act should apply equally to the other. The problem,
according to this reading, is the untenable disanalogous assessments of
lying as absolutely prohibited and of violent coercion as sometimes justified.12 Weaver and Decosimo disagree about who bears responsibility for
these two ethical assessments and about how best to resolve the evident
(Weaver) or apparent (Decosimo) conflict. Weaver believes scholars have
interpreted Augustine correctly and the fault for the incoherence lies
with Augustine. Decosimo believes that acts of lying and killing are congruent in Augustine’s thought but that scholars have misinterpreted the
ethics of lying such that Augustine is made to appear inconsistent.
Weaver faults Augustine. Decosimo faults Augustine’s interpreters. Neither considers the image of God or how it might illuminate a more coherent picture of how the ethics of lying and killing fit within a distinctively
Augustinian theological frame. In order to see how Augustine’s moral
reasoning might hold together disanalogous judgments regarding lying
and killing, we must reconsider the reading methods that have generated the standard interpretation of Augustine’s ethics of lying.
2.3 Intertextual-canonical or genetic-historical? Reading Augustine’s
ethics of lying
Much ink has been spilled detailing Augustine’s ethics of lying. There
are five basic elements:
1. A lie is a false signification with an intention to deceive [falsa
significatio cum voluntate fallendi] (see c. mend. 12.26; mend.
3.1; ench. 7.22);
2. All lying is a sin and thus absolutely prohibited. Lies cannot be
justified, no exceptions (see mend. 18.37; ench. 6.18, 7.22);
11

John von Heyking advances yet another interpretation suggesting that Augustine did
not hold an absolute prohibition of private lying but does condone lies where the “final
purpose” is to “fulfill an obligation to love God and neighbor” (von Heyking 2001, 114–20).
12
Rist represents the more widely held view that lying and killing in Augustine’s ethics
are morally disanalogous acts: “Perhaps an analogue is to be found with killing more easily
than lying, since lying, as a curiously religious offense like blasphemy and apostasy, may
be always forbidden” (Rist 1994, 197).
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3. Scripture might seem to condone lies. It does not (see ep. 28;
mend. 15.26–18.39; ep. 82; c. mend. 10.25–17.36);
4. A just cause, loving motivation, good intention, or the avoidance
of horrendous consequences might seem to justify lying. They do
not (see c. mend. 7.17–10.24; ench. 7.22);
5. Some lies are worse than others. No one may be acquitted of a lie
they have told, though they may be pardoned (see en. Ps. 5.7;
mend. 13.23–14.25; c. mend. 8.19, 15.31–17.35; ep. 82.22; ench.
7.22). More culpable lies require greater punishment or penance
for their pardon.
All of this is standard fare in scholarship on Augustine’s ethics of lying,
and all of it is correct. At least up to a point.
Augustine affirms each of these propositions numerous times and in
multiple texts, particularly in his two major works on the topic—De mendacio (395) and Contra mendacium (420). Predictably, in nearly any article addressing Augustine on lying, these features are taken for granted
or prominent among the elements addressed in praise or critique.13
Although there have always been those who contest the validity of this
ethic of lying, more important for understanding Augustine rightly are
those who contest this standard interpretation of Augustine either on
one of the major points, their finer details, or the moral reasoning
informing his argumentation. Some critical engagements draw extensively upon Augustine’s own writings to advance sweeping reconsiderations
of the standard account. Depending on one’s assumptions, interpretations that are incompatible with the above features might be persuasively argued as representing Augustine’s thought. For example, there are
warrants for Decosimo’s thesis that “Augustine is not best understood as
forbidding lying absolutely . . . he would permit and require lying in certain circumstances,” just as there are for John von Heyking’s interpretation that “lying is not only permissible in certain circumstances, but also
required” (Decosimo 2010, 662; von Heyking 2001, 118). Both scholars
discover elements within Augustine’s thought that might lead us in a
direction other than the standard, what we might call “canonical,” reading. The relevant interpretive question here, however, is whether the
warrants for these minority reports are stronger than those of the scholarly consensus regarding Augustine on the topic of lying.
13

See, for example, Brinton 1983; Ramsey 1985; Feehan 1988, 1990, 1991; Fleming
1993; Dodaro 1994; Newey 1997; Griffiths 1999, 2004; von Heyking 2001; Weaver 2001;
Davis 2001; Johnson 2001; Levenick 2004; Decosimo 2010; Gramigna 2013; Tollefsen 2014.
Among Augustine’s most careful interpreters on the topic of lying, Griffiths addresses each
of these standard elements (see Griffiths 2004, 25–39). Though he does not enumerate
them as I do, Griffiths affirms these elements with some nuances and exceptions to which
we will return below.
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The standard reading is “canonical” not only in constituting a scholarly
consensus, but also in terms of its intertextual method.14 The vast majority of scholars (including Decosimo, Griffiths, von Heyking, and Weaver)
read the major writings on lying across Augustine’s career intertextually,
synthesizing them as if they constituted a coherent whole and as if
apparent discrepancies can be ironed out, so to speak, by appeal to other
texts, categories, and distinctions.15 Such intertextual-canonical or synthetic reading implies, without justifying the assumption, that Augustine’s ethics of lying remain sufficiently consistent such that any
developments occur within a coherent overall frame. Such assumptions
are evident when scholars claim that we can discern what Augustine
meant to conclude regarding a particular case presented, for example, in
De mendacio by reading what he says about another allegedly analogous
case in De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (see von Heyking 2001,
119). Likewise, we might interpret the entirety of Augustine’s writings on
lying in light of a public/private distinction voiced by Evodius in De libero
arbitrio to differentiate between species of killing (see Decosimo 2010,
666n15; lib. arb. 1.5.12–13). The very question scholars consistently put
to Augustine and attempt to answer, “What was his ethic of lying?,” thus
creates a selection bias. It implies that Augustine offers a single ethic of
lying across his corpus just waiting to be discovered if we can discern
and rightly order the pieces that constitute the whole. The presumption
14
On “intertextuality,” see Daniel Boyarin’s distinction between rabbinic midrash as an
intertextual reading strategy that constitutes an alternative to the reading strategies of
both “Higher Criticism” and the “historical school” (Boyarin 1990, 20–21, 39–41).
15
Boniface Ramsey writes that in Contra mendacium Augustine is “elaborating some of
the principles already set down in De mendacio” (Ramsey 1985, 508). Elsewhere, Ramsey
writes, “The doctrine on lying contained in Contra mendacium adds relatively little to that
found in De mendacio” (Ramsey 2009, 556). Decosimo also finds that “there are no differences between the two texts that are relevant for our purposes” (Decosimo 2010, 662n3).
Weaver sees little difference between the texts in terms of content, though Contra mendacium is “a less clear denunciation of lies” in contrast to the “fairly theoretical character of
De mendacio” (Weaver 2001, 56). Griffiths brackets the question of historical development,
but assumes none in his methodology: “My goal is not to provide a complete and historically
nuanced account of Augustine on the lie. I want, rather, to lay bare the structure of his
thought on the topic, its grammar and syntax, and to make constructive use and application of that structure” (Griffiths 2004, 16). Feehan’s articles cite the two major texts without discussion of possible differences since their shared “aim, as is well known, was to
prove that the lie is not justifiable under any circumstances” (Feehan 1988, 132). Von Heyking, unlike Feehan, reads De mendacio as a justification for lying intentionally written in
such a manner “that Augustine’s ideas will be clear only to the attentive reader” (von Heyking 2001, 115), and he reads Contra mendacium—in which a “prohibition against lying is
made clear” (von Heyking 2001, 114)—as a more pragmatic and politically motivated letter
than as a useful account of Augustine’s ethic of lying. He alone finds real conflict because
he interprets De mendacio as advancing an argument about the conditions that justify
lying. None of these authors discuss developments in Augustine’s ethics.

Retracing Augustine’s Ethics

695

of a canonical reading then warrants the intertextual use of selected texts
and categories as the lenses through which to read disparate texts and
categories.16 The shortcoming of such interpretations is their tendency to
overlook incongruities or minimize developments in Augustine’s thought
that a historicized reading leaves intact.
In contrast to the intertextuality nurtured by canonical readings, a
genetic-historical reading encourages careful attention to theological and
methodological developments across Augustine’s writings.17 Augustine was
as cognizant of his development as anyone.18 Scholars have increasingly taken up questions of his development with respect to the origin of the soul,
nature and grace, religious conversion, and political coercion (see Fredriksen
Landes 1982; O’Connell 1987; Brown 2000, 139–50, 482–513; Markus 2006,
51–69; Rombs 2006; Harrison 2008; BeDuhn 2010; Couenhoven 2013). Similarly, Augustine’s expositions of the image of God exhibit considerable development over time, particularly between his two major works on lying, De
mendacio (395) and Contra mendacium (420).19 A genetic-historical or diachronic reading allows features of his evolving moral reasoning to come into
16
When scholars acknowledge that Augustine adds elements in later writings on lying
not present in earlier ones, c. mend. 7.18 is often the example given (see Ramsey 2009,
556).
17
On “genetic-historical” interpretation and the priority of methodology over material
decisions, see McCormack 1995, viii–ix.
18
Augustine sees his development as a function of writing, preaching, and exposition: “We
who preach and write books write in a manner altogether different from that in which the holy
canonical books were written. We develop as we write [proficiendo scribimus], learning something
new every day, preaching as we explore, speaking as we knock . . . you should not take any previous book or preaching of mine as canonical scripture [canonica scriptura]” (s. 162C); “I am among
those who write while developing and develop while writing [proficiendo scribunt et scribendo
proficiunt]” (ep. 143.2–4); “I should wish no one to embrace all my teaching. . . . I have undertaken
to retrace [retractanda] my works in order to show that I have not always held the same views;
rather, I believe I developed [proficienter], by God’s mercy, while writing. . . . We can have good
hope for someone if the last day of this life finds him still developing” (don. persev. 21.55).
19
Augustine’s pre-Confessions writings refer to a disposition of the rational soul toward [ad]
the image of God whereas only the second person of the Trinity is [est] the image of God (Gn. litt.
imp. 16.55–60). In Confessions, this becomes a disposition toward the Trinity for the first time, and
not specifically the Son (Conf. 13.22.32). Between 401 and 413, Augustine first affirms that the
rational soul itself is the image of God (op. mon. 32.40), then that the in-spirited mind (qua image
of God) is lost in the fall (Gn. litt. 6.24.35) before wavering on this point and later asserting that the
mind (qua image of God) is merely veiled by the law and thus the image is not lost in the fall (spir.
et litt. 28.48). Finally, in De Trinitate the image of God is defined as the mind’s non-adventitious,
existing capacity [capax est] for potentially participating [particeps potest] in the contemplation of
Wisdom when activated by the Holy Spirit (Trin. 14.4.6, 14.8.11, 14.12.15). In important respects
Augustine’s ethics develop in parallel to and as a corollary of his theological anthropology. Thus,
with respect to the later Augustine, Griffiths is correct: the image of God is integral to Augustine’s
ethics of lying, and Augustine’s conclusions presuppose “a large number of truths about God’s
nature and the image of God in us” (Griffiths 2004, 15). I would add that insofar as Augustine’s
image of God evolves, the respects in which it informs Augustine’s ethics of lying also changes.
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view in ways that the intertextual-canonical readings of both the standard
interpretation and the minority reports tend to elide. Once recognized, such
developments aid in arbitrating disputes about analogous and disanalogous
acts in Augustine’s ethics as well as competing interpretations of the ethics of
lying.

3. Retracing Augustine’s Ethics of Lying
3.1 Before the standard interpretation
Evidence of Augustine’s developing moral reasoning begins to emerge
already in his earliest writings on lying. Augustine first engages the
ethics of lying in the Enarrationes in Psalmos. Expositing Psalm 5 (c.
392)—particularly Psalm 5:7 (“You will destroy all those who speak a
lie”)20—Augustine makes several claims about lying from which the
standard interpretation, based upon De mendacio and Contra mendacium is shown already to involve developments beyond this earliest
account.21
Three particular claims in en. Ps. 5 that are already overturned by
the penning of De mendacio have to do with the definition of lying,
whether jokes are lies, and the (non)necessity of lies. In the earlier text,
“joking” and “lying to be helpful” are considered two examples of “lies to
which no great blame is attached, and yet they are not completely without blame” (en. Ps. 5.7). Joking is a lie, and thus morally blameworthy,
but there are worse lies one could tell. Three years later, De mendacio
explicitly denies that jokes are lies. In the latter, Augustine excludes joking from his discussion of lies on the grounds that the joker “has in mind
no deceit” (mend. 1.2). This restatement presents not only a change of
judgment regarding the moral species of joking but also a new definition
of lying. Whereas the first account considers joking to be a blameworthy
lie, De mendacio asserts the opposite on the grounds of a new definition

20
This is Psalm 5:6 in many English Bibles that depart from the Hebrew, Greek, and
Latin texts. The latter regularly begin numbering the verses of Psalms with traditional
titles that the former leave unnumbered.
21
Augustine’s exposition of Psalm 5:7 includes two texts that feature prominently in his
ethical writings on lying: “This is what should be on your lips: ‘yes, yes; no, no;’ anything
more than that is from the evil one” (Matthew 5:37), and “A lie in the mouth kills the soul”
(Wisdom 1:11). Of the more than one hundred scriptural quotations in the seven major
writings on lying, Matthew 5:37 and Wisdom 1:11 stand out in different respects. Matthew
5:37 is the sole text cited in each of the major writings; Matthew 5:37 and Wisdom 1:11 are
the two texts with the most overall citations (ten and seven, respectively); Wisdom 1:11
holds the distinction of being the text most quoted in any single writing, with six in De
mendacio alone.
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of lying that incorporates and makes essential the element of an
“intention to deceive” (mend. 3.3–5.5, 14.25). From a change in the definition of lying follows a changed judgment regarding the blameworthiness of joking.22
A third development involves the necessity of lying. The exposition of
Psalm 5:7 suggests that some people, such as the “perfect disciples” [perfecti], attain a perfection in which they tell not even the least culpable
lies. Although “those who are perfect” will be capable of avoiding lies of
every sort, “if [someone] is not yet able to do this, then he should tell
only those lies which are necessary” (en. Ps. 5.7). Augustine has in view
a particular case: “If someone, for example, does not want to betray
another person even to the death we all can see, he ought to be willing
to conceal the truth, but not to tell a lie” (en. Ps. 5.7). Although the perfect tell no lies, in order to save another’s life, en. Ps. 5 allows that the
imperfect may find it necessary to lie in such a case. A few years later,
De mendacio disallows lying in precisely this exceptional case. Even if “a
man should take refuge with you, who by your lie might be saved from
death,” Augustine now concludes the opposite of what he previously had:
“No one can prove that at times a lie is necessary” (mend. 7.10).23
Revisions such as these three are not restricted to lying, but rather

22

Weaver, Griffiths, and Decosimo offer competing accounts of Augustine’s understanding of joking in relation to lying, each of which aims to bolster a particular interpretation
of the ethics of lying. None of their interpretations of joking cite en. Ps. 5 and so none
observes how this earliest account of lying defines lying differently, treats joking as a culpable lie, or entertains a “necessary” lie (see Weaver 2001, 57; Griffiths 2004, 29, 34–35; Decosimo 2010, 663–64). A rare exception, Christopher Levenick notes that en. Ps. 5.7
contradicts Augustine’s expositions of joking and lying elsewhere. However, rather than
attending to the dating of this text or considering the possibility of historical development,
he exhibits an intertextual-canonical method in accounting for the evident inconsistencies
with Augustine’s major writings. “Given the larger context of Augustine’s writings on lying
and joking, I must determine that in the latter sentence, Augustine intended fallendi voluntas rather than duplex cor: quandoque bonus dormitat Augustinus” (Levenick 2004,
309n34). That is, excusing Augustine for nodding off at the crucial point, Levenick replaces
Augustine’s term “duplex cor” (a term common to Augustine’s writings from 392–395) with
“fallendi voluntas” (a term Augustine does not use systematically in defining a lie until De
mendacio in 395), explaining that Augustine must have meant something other than what
he wrote in en. Ps. 5.7 (in 392).
23
Augustine also rejects the possibility of a necessary lie in a contemporaneous letter in
which he chides Jerome, “are you perhaps going to give us some rules by which we might
know where it is necessary to lie and where it is not?” (ep. 28.3.5). In case Jerome misses
his sarcasm, Augustine lays it on a bit thicker, “Please, do not explain it with lying and
dubious reasons . . . it is surely not a great fault by which my error favors the truth, if in
your case the truth can correctly favor a lie” (ep. 28.3.5). Mocking the idea of necessary
lies, Augustine’s frustration derives from Jerome’s suggestion that Peter and Paul colluded
in a case of “useful lying” (see ep. 28.3.3–5; see also Plato 1992, 2.381–83, 3.412–17).
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correspond to ongoing developments in other aspects of Augustine’s moral reasoning to which scholars have given considerable attention.24
Collectively, these elements highlight development in Augustine’s moral reasoning prior to the standard account that relies heavily upon De
mendacio. Individually, each element also provides potential fodder for
those who would object to various features of the standard interpretation. Not surprisingly, some interpretations of Augustine’s “ethic of lying”
(those that treat it as if it were static) prove to be more commensurate
with Augustine’s moral reasoning in one period than they are with his
thought during another. With additional elements of the later ethics of
lying in view, we are afforded a much broader perspective on and greater
appreciation for developments beyond the standard account.
3.2 On the Trinity and its image: the basis and limits of an analogy
More than thirty years after his first reflections on lying, De Trinitate
presents a markedly distinct approach to theological reflection on lying.
Augustine begins Book 15 by reminding his audience about the aims of
the intellectual exercise through which this difficult text guides the reader. Its purpose is to inculcate a contemplative love for the triune God
while training readers in the recognition of several key distinctions.
First, the generation of the Son from the Father is distinct from the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Second, human
nature consists of body and soul, and the mind is not the entire soul but
only its highest part—the rational soul [animus] consists of the irrational part of the soul [anima] held in common with the beasts plus the
mind [mens] that is common to humans and angels. Third, although
human beings are rightly said to be the “image of God,” it is only with
respect to the mind or rational part of the soul—and not the body or the
lesser parts of the soul—that human beings are so called. And fourth,
building upon the above affirmations, the image of God in the mind demonstrates to natural reason what scripture teaches and the Catholic faith
affirms regarding the distinction between the generation of the Son and
the procession of the Holy Spirit within the Trinity.25 De Trinitate serves
as an exercise that teaches these doctrines in order that readers might
grow in faith and wisdom, increasing in both understanding of and love
for the triune God.26
24

Prominent among these are his reflections on the (non)attainability of perfection in
this life (see Brown 2000, 144–50; Fredriksen Landes 1982, ix–xii; Harrison 2008).
25
Augustine’s affirmations of agreement between Scripture and natural reason trace
back to Acad. 3.20.43.
26
See Roland Kany’s argument that the intended audience includes believers, those
“skeptical about Christianity,” and “that he normally had unbelievers in mind as well”
(Kany 2013, 387–99).
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In pursuance of our plan to train [exercere] the reader, in the things that
have been made (Rom 1.20), for getting to know him by whom we were
made, we came eventually to his image. This is the human [homo] insofar
as it excels other animals, i.e. reason or intelligence, and whatever else can
be said about the rational or intellectual soul that potentially pertains to
what is called “mind” [mens] or “rational soul” [animus]. Several Latin
authors have used this latter word, animus, to distinguish what is preeminent in humans and not found in beasts by a proper name of its own
from the soul, anima, which is in humans and beasts alike. (Trin. 15.1.1)

The reason to investigate the mind or rational soul is not to understand the
mind for its own sake but as a preliminary step toward understanding the triune God through the image of the Trinity: “We are looking for God, going step
by step through various trinities of different sorts until we eventually arrive at
the human mind” (Trin. 15.2.3). For although there are many “likenesses that
are useful for understanding God with, as far as this is possible; of such likenesses none is more suitable than the one which is not called God’s image for
nothing” (Trin. 15.9.16).27 The mind, as the image of God, manifests a greater
likeness to the Trinity in its attributes than any of the Trinity’s other vestiges
either in the several lower trinities in the human or in the rest of creation.
After distinguishing the substantial and relational attributes that the
image of God shares with the divine nature from those it lacks, Augustine indicates the distinctive ways the image of God manifests instructive analogies to the Trinitarian processions and to the mission of the
Son in the incarnation. Examining the divine and human processes of
generating or begetting a “word,” the human mind discovers itself to be
an image of the Trinity it seeks to contemplate. What Augustine is
“trying to do is somehow to see him by whom we were made by means of
this image which we ourselves are, as through a mirror” (Trin. 15.8.14).
As the mind contemplates its own process of generating words, it is
reflecting upon the nearest analogue to the Trinity that exists—nearest
in the sense of similarity, but also nearest in the sense of its immediate
proximity to itself. The mind actively images the processions of the

27
Protestant Reformers otherwise appreciative in their reception of Augustine were
uncharacteristically critical of his speculations regarding the image of God (see Luther
1958, 60–61; Calvin 1960, 190). Modern theologians are similarly critical, taking issue with
Augustine’s association of the image of God with the rational soul. Kathryn Tanner, for
example, begins Christ the Key with a query that announces a distinctively Christological
interpretation of the image of God: “What light might be thrown on the well-worn idea that
human beings are created in the image of God, if Christ were the key to understanding it?”
(Tanner 2010, 1). Thus Tanner and others might affirm Augustine’s statement that among
the “likenesses that are useful for understanding God with . . . none is more suitable than
the one which is not called God’s image for nothing,” albeit with a very different understanding of what constitutes the “image of God” and with different results where their
respective doctrines of God and the divine attributes are concerned.
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Trinity when its self-knowing produces an accurate understanding of
itself such that it loves itself as the image of God that it is.
The Pauline statement that “we now see through a mirror in an enigma,
but then it will be face to face” (1 Corinthians 13:12)—where “mirror” refers
to “image” and “enigma” refers to “likeness”—indicates that whatever the
mind’s eye perceives, it perceives through the very image of God. The twin
processes of thinking and (subsequently) communicating together shed light
both on the eternal generation of the Word of God in relation to the procession of the Spirit and on the assumption of a human nature by the Word of
God in the Incarnation. Augustine thus distinguishes between two basic
types of “words” generated by the human mind that index the Word of God in
what would come to be known as the immanent and economic trinities,
respectively. These two words are integral to the relationship between the
image of God and lying where the two concerns are brought together.
3.3 Two words: immanent Trinitarian processions and the economic
Christological mission
First, there is a “word” uttered inwardly that precedes all signs and
significations needed in order to communicate this word to another.
These are pre-linguistic words in the thinking mind, “begotten of the
knowledge abiding in the rational soul, when this knowledge is uttered
inwardly just as it is” (Trin. 15.11.20). Such words derive from truths or
ideas capable of being retrieved from the memory, where they are readily
available for the mind’s active knowing, should the mind will to bring
them forward into the intellect’s conscious thinking attention.28 In a perfectly functioning mind, this first word is a faithful representation of a
truth generated from the memory through the mind’s remembering,
knowing, and willing this truth in the process of thinking.29 Augustine
considers the generative, triadic process of remembering, knowing, and
willing a word to be analogous to the immanent procession of the eternally begotten Word of God, the second person of the Trinity.30 The will
28

On “the word that belongs to no language,” see Trin. 15.10.19.
“For when we utter something true, that is when we utter what we know, a word is
necessarily born from the knowledge which we hold in the memory, a word which is absolutely the same kind of thing as the knowledge it is born from. It is the thought formed
from the thing we know that is the word which we utter in the heart, a word that is neither Greek nor Latin nor any other language; but when it is necessary to convey the knowledge in the language of those we are speaking to, some sign is adopted to signify this word.
And usually a sound, sometimes also a gesture is presented, the one to their ears and the
other to their eyes, in order that bodily signs may make the word we carry in our minds
known to their bodily senses” (Trin. 15.10.19).
30
“If anyone, I say, can understand this, he can already see through this mirror and in
this enigma some likeness of that Word of which it is said, In the beginning was the Word,
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (Trin. 15.10.19, quoting John 1:1).
29
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constitutes a unifying bond of agreement between the truth known from
memory and the true word generated by and from this truth as it is
being thought by the intellect. This true word serves as the basis from
which a second word is measured as either constituting a lie or not.
The second “word” is that which has assumed a sign appropriate for
communication through language and the senses. This second word may
be expressed sensibly, visually or audibly, but it is no less a second, distinct word if it remains in the thinking mind without being expressed
sensibly. Compared to the first word, it differs primarily not in that it is
expressed sensibly but in that it is a word that has assumed a sensible
sign. The primary referent of the term “word” is the first pre-linguistic
word generated in thought rather than this second word that re-presents
the first word by taking on the form of a particular sensible sign. When
uttered in the mind, the second type of word already includes the signifier of a particular language that it takes on for communicating to others.
Should the word that has assumed a sign be expressed sensibly to
others, it is the mind that willfully both determines what sensible sign
will be used and decides the sensible means of manifesting to others the
word initially generated in the mind. “The vocal sounds of our speech
are signs of the things we are thinking of. Thus the word which makes a
sound outside is the sign of the word which lights up inside, and it is
this latter, pre-linguistic word that primarily deserves the name of
‘word’” (Trin. 15.10.19–11.20). The sign-assuming word is paradigmatically borne outward to others by speech, though this is by no means the
only means of sensibly signifying the word generated in thinking attention (see Trin. 9.7.12, 15.10.19; c. mend. 10.24–13.28). Signification of a
word can also assume other sensible representations such as written
words and bodily gestures. Regardless of the sensible mode of manifestation, whereas the first, pre-linguistic word is analogous to the eternally
begotten Word of God, the second, sign-assuming word is analogous to
the Word that assumes flesh, the incarnate Word that takes a temporal,
human form.31
So, the mind as an image of the Trinity generates these two types of
words—a pre-linguistic word generated from the memory and a signassuming word capable of sensible expression—whose distinction promises to aid in attaining a greater understanding of the Trinity, especially
31

With respect to the second word, see John 1:14 and Philippians 2:3–8. “Our word
becomes a bodily sound by assuming that in which it is manifested to the senses of men,
just as the Word of God became flesh by assuming that in which it too could be manifested
to the senses of men. And just as our word becomes sound without being changed into
sound, so the Word of God became flesh, but it is unthinkable that it should have been
changed into flesh. It is by assuming it, not by being consumed into it, that both our word
becomes sound and that Word became flesh” (Trin. 15.11.20).
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its processions and missions but also certain of its substantial and relational attributes. For the purpose of understanding the second person of
the Trinity (the Word of God both in its immanent generation from the
Father and in its economic assumption of a human nature) through one’s
investigation of the created image of the Trinity (the human mind’s generating of a pre-linguistic word and its assumption of a sensible sign), it
is necessary to differentiate between the first and second human words.
Human words are useful for contemplating the Trinity where there is a
recognition of the distinction between the pre-linguistic and signassuming types of human words.
Therefore if you wish to arrive at some kind of likeness of the Word of God,
however unlike it may be in many ways, do not look at that word of ours
which sounds in the ears, neither when it is uttered vocally or when it is
thought of silently . . . we must come to that word of man, the word of a
rational animal, the word of the image of God which is not born of God but
made by God, the word which is neither uttered in sound nor thought of in
the likeness of sound which necessarily belongs to some language, but
which precedes all the signs that signify it and is begotten of the knowledge abiding in the consciousness, when this knowledge is uttered inwardly
just exactly as it is. (Trin. 15.11.20)

The first, pre-linguistic word is analogous to the eternal Word of God.
The second, signifying word is analogous to the temporal incarnation of
the Word of God.
3.3.1

THE TRINITARIAN PRE-LINGUISTIC

“YES,

YES; NO, NO”

Having distinguished these two words, Augustine next draws two
analogies to consider how the first, pre-linguistic word and the second,
sign-assuming word in the rational soul are related to the eternal procession of the Son (qua Word of God) from the Father and to the temporal
works of God done through the incarnate Word of God, Jesus Christ (see
John 1:1, 14). These analogies make use of Trinitarian and Christological
dynamics in order to explicate the “yes, yes, no, no” [est est non non] of
Matthew 5:37, the biblical text to which Augustine appeals most consistently in his writings on lying.32
The first analogy is between truth in the rational soul and substance
in the divine nature. The generation of a true word whose truth is a unity with the thing that is in awareness of the memory is analogous to the
generation of the Son whose nature is consubstantial with the Father.
The first word to proceed from the rational soul is generated from the
32

See en. Ps. 5.7; s. Dom. mon. 17.51; mend. 5.6, 15.28; ep. 82; s. 180; c. mend. 16.33;
ench. 5.17, 7.22; Trin. 15.11.20, 15.14.23. James 5.12 repeats this account (see s. 180). See
also 2 Corinthians 1:17.
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awareness of memory such that the same truth is in the awareness of
memory and in the thinking attention, just as in the generation of the
Word of God from the Father the same substance is in both.
When, therefore, that which is in the knowledge is also in a word, then is
it a true word, and the truth which is expected from man, so that what is
in the knowledge is also in the word, and what is not in the knowledge is
not in the word; it is here that we acknowledge the “yes, yes; no, no.” In
this way the likeness of the made image approaches as far as it can the
likeness of the born image, in which God the Son is declared to be substantially like the Father in all respects. (Trin. 15.11.20)

The image of God is most like God when producing true words about
God and itself in relation to God. True words are those that exhibit
truth-content agreement between the knowledge in the memory and the
first, pre-linguistic word of intellectual thought.
In De Trinitate, the “yes, yes; no, no” to which Augustine appeals in
this passage takes on the distinctively Trinitarian and Christological
referents that we have already been observing and which are without
precedent in his earlier expositions either of Matthew 5:37 specifically or
of lying in general. The first referent of the “yes, yes; no, no” is the
immanent Trinitarian one just observed in which the correspondence
between two words indexes an analogy between the consubstantial procession of the Son (qua Word of God) from the Father and the unity of
truth-content in the generation of the pre-linguistic word from the thing
known in the memory.
3.3.2

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL SIGN-ASSUMING

“YES,

YES; NO, NO”

The second referent of the “yes, yes; no, no” of Matthew 5:37 in De
Trinitate makes use of this analogy to the processions of the immanent
Trinity but adds the Christological dimension of God’s creation through
the Word of God. It is here that Augustine takes up the possibility of
lying. Just as God made all things through his only-begotten Word—“All
things were made through him [the Word]” (John 1:3)—so too all human
action in the world is a voluntary response to that which one knows to
be true regarding good works. The rational soul stores knowledge of
good and evil in the memory. All moral action begins with the willing
selection of a sign-assuming word, the content of which either truthfully
or falsely signifies the rational soul’s knowledge regarding good works.
The voluntary generation of a true sign-assuming word about good
human action is the beginning of a good work. On the other hand, willfully generating sign-assuming words about good human action that do
not derive from the knowledge of good works amounts to sin. The origin
of sin in the rational soul occurs in a willing acquiescence to a desire to

704

Journal of Religious Ethics

generate a second, sign-assuming word that does not signify the prelinguistic word it knows to be the true word regarding its knowledge of
good works.
Therefore, every human action begins with the generation of a word.
Whether a human work is just or sinful, however, depends upon whether
the work derives from one’s knowledge regarding good works. For every
“yes” or “no” in one’s knowledge about moral action, the mind willfully
selects either a true sign-assuming word or it selects a false second
word. It is through this true or false second word that one produces righteous or sinful works.
There are no works [opere] of man that are not first uttered in the heart. That
is why it is written, The beginning of every work is a word (Sir 37:16). Here
too, if it is a true word, it is the beginning of a good work [boni operis]. And a
word is true when it is begotten of the knowledge of how to work well [bene
operandi], so that here too one may apply the “yes, yes; no, no”; so that if it is
yes in the knowledge by which one lives, it should be yes in the word through
which one has to work [operandum], and if no, no. Otherwise, such a word
will be a lie [mendacium] and not the truth, and from it will come a sin [peccatum], not a right work [opus rectum]. (Trin. 15.11.20)

The genesis of every sin is a prior lie in the rational soul. Every righteous work in the world, on the other hand, begins with a true signassuming word.33
Voluntary consent to a wrongly ordered desire in the human mind generates a second word that is not true to the first word in the mind’s knowledge regarding not only what is eternally true and good but also what is
true and good with respect to moral living in the saeculum—“how to work
well” or how “one ought to live.” In the rational soul, such a word is a lie
and a sin, but not yet a work. The mind lies (and kills itself spiritually) the
moment it willfully selects a false signifier for this second word. Subsequently, through this false word generated as a lie, the rational soul produces a sinful work as it incarnates, as it operationalizes through the inner
word toward the outer, temporal, sensible world. Thus, in two stages a sinful deed results from a desire to generate a word in the rational soul that is
untrue to one’s knowledge about good human action and the moral life.
3.4 Inseparable operations: the image of God ad extra
As the Word of God incarnate was not merely eternal Wisdom and
Truth but also a human life, so the human mind incarnates through its
33
Although every sin has as its precondition a lie, not every lie of this sort generates a
sinful work. “We can have a word which is not followed by a work” (Trin. 15.11.20). The
reason for this is that like most classical conceptions of the logos asarkos, the word of the
rational soul need not incarnate. It need not be operationalized as a work.
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sign-assuming words that are understood, quite expansively, to include
the embodied existence in which one lives and works, whether for good
or for ill. Just as all of God’s works ad extra are created through the
Word of God that was capable of assuming flesh, so also the image of
God creates all of its external works through its own sign-assuming
words. Here, the immanent, Trinitarian dynamics involved in the generation of the Word of God, the second person of the Trinity, are operative
in the economic, historical life of the incarnate Christ. This translation
from an immanent Word of God into an economic work is instructive to
the rational soul in two senses.
First, Christ’s example of a true, sinless life of good works demonstrates how one ought to live.34 Augustine emphasizes that the specific
reason the second person of the Trinity—the “Word” of God through
whom all things were made—incarnates is to provide an example for the
image of the Trinity to follow. The righteous works of the image of the
Trinity ad extra are the outworking, into the world, of its own previously
generated true and good words.
And the reason why it was not God the Father, not the Holy Spirit, not the
Trinity itself, but only the Son who is the Word of God who became flesh,
although it was the Trinity that accomplished this, is that we might live
rightly [recte viveremus] by our word following and imitating his example;
that is by our having no lie [mendacium] either in the contemplation [contemplatione] or in the work [operatione] of our word. (Trin. 15.11.20)

The incarnation of the Word reveals that our human words ought to be
true in contemplation in order that they might be operationalized in
righteous living. Where the mind willfully assigns to the sign-assuming
word a signifier from the memory’s knowledge of the truth about good
and evil works, the ad extra operations of speech and the moral life
incarnate this sign-assuming word, bearing the justice of one’s rational
soul out into the world.
What is more, the inseparable operations of the Trinity suggest
another sense in which the second, sign-assuming word in the rational soul is like the Trinity creating through the Word who is the
Son. Not only were all things made through the Word (John 1:3), but
all God’s works ad extra are indivisible. Likewise, the self-reflexive
memory, intellect, and will are inseparably operative in all human
action that flows out of the rational soul. Every human work is indivisibly the work of the entire image of the Trinity in the rational
soul, albeit signified sensibly through the word generated in the
mind. Each and every work is righteous or sinful depending upon
34
Augustine argues that Christ’s life is exemplary in these respects on the basis of John
14:6; Hebrews 4:15; and 1 Corinthians 11:1.
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whether the sign-assuming word is true or a lie in relation to one’s
pre-linguistic knowledge of good and evil.
3.5 Ignorance, errors, and lies: finite knowledge, flawed intellect, and evil
will
After exploring the Trinitarian and Christological analogues of the
image of God in the pre-linguistic and sign-assuming words in the
“yes, yes; no, no” of Matthew 5:37, Augustine takes up yet another
collocation of terms with further analogical possibilities.35 Augustine
perceives the Trinitarian structure of reality nearly everywhere,
including in the partition of philosophy into natural, rational, and
moral (see civ. 11.25). The rational soul reflects this structure not
only in the properly functioning inseparable operations of memory,
intellect, and will, but also in the corresponding deficiencies of its
fallen state: ignorance, errors, and lies. Thus, De Trinitate 15
explores the relationship of God’s omniscience, simplicity, and omnipotence to the fallen human’s finite knowledge, flawed intellect, and
evil will.
3.5.1

IGNORANCE: CREATURELY FINITUDE OF KNOWLEDGE

There is nothing essentially sinful about ignorance. It is a basic
feature of human finitude. Human beings were not created to be
omniscient. The mind’s rational nature was created with a properly
functioning intellect integrated with a rightly ordered will. A properly functioning mind would correctly remember and reason about what
it had come to know to be true, properly accounting for its ignorance.
The first “yes” (or “no”) in its knowledge would be followed by a corresponding “yes” (or “no”) in its reasoning. In matters about which
the mind was ignorant, lacking knowledge in the memory, there simply would not be a “yes” (or “no”). The things stored in the memory
could come to be known either through consciousness or bodily sensation, with the testimony of others mediating additional knowledge
through the latter.36 Prior to the Fall, the human mind knew that it
knew all that it knew without error, including those things about
35

Augustine finds Trinitarian vestiges throughout the natural order. See vera rel.
55.112–13; ep. 11; div. qu. 38; civ. 11.24–28. See also Ayres 2010, 63–67, 133–41, 277–81.
36
“All these things then that the human soul knows by perceiving them through itself
or through the senses of the body or through the testimony of others, it holds onto where
they are stacked away in the treasury of memory. From them is begotten a true word when
we utter what we know, but a word before any sound, before any thought of sound. For it
is then that the word is most like the thing known, and most its image . . . and it is a word
of no language, a true word from a true thing, having nothing from itself, but everything
from that knowledge from which it is born” (Trin. 15.13.22).
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which it knew itself to be ignorant.37 According to Augustine, for
those of us who live after the Fall, it is not enough to observe the
inevitability of ignorance that results from human finitude of the preFall variety. Rather, we must also contend with the ways in which
ignorance inevitably increases as a result of novel, post-Fall sources
of falsehood—namely, error and lies.
3.5.2

ERROR: UNKNOWINGLY WILLING FALSE WORDS

Whereas ignorance is a first-order deficiency of knowledge that Augustine associates with the memory, error is a second-order deficiency of
knowledge—an intellectual lack of knowledge about the knowledge
stored in the memory. Ignorance is a lack of knowing. Error is a misknowing; a deletion or depletion of knowing that mistakenly takes what
is true to be false and what is false to be true. Understanding ignorance
as a deficiency in knowledge makes conceptualizing error difficult.
Although ignorance existed prior to the Fall, there was not yet error
in human knowing and thinking—in the memory and the intellect. Even
after the Fall, however, it is still the case that human knowledge “must
all be true, otherwise it would not be known. No one knows false things
except when he knows them to be false. If he knows this, he knows
something true, since it is true that they are false” (Trin. 15.10.17).
According to Augustine, the false things that one believes to be true (and
true things that one believes to be false) are not properly “knowledge”
but “errors,” deficiencies of knowledge. Errors are neither mere ignorances of pre-Fall human beings nor are they sinful in the way lies are.
Error reflects the additional natural evil of mis-knowing by the intellect.
Errors differ from ignorance in that ignorance involves only a deficiency,
a lack of knowledge, and not necessarily a mistake in one’s thinking.
Even a mind that wills to express the truth to itself or to another
mind regularly errs in doing so because of the intellect’s improper functioning that is an effect of inherited sin. If the intellect errs in its reasoning, then the “yes” in the knowledge of the memory may generate “error”
(call this mis-knowledge: “yes*”) in the thinking attention that contains
more or less than the thing known. This “yes*” is then deposited (including a partial withdrawal) in the memory as mis-knowledge about which
the mind is ignorant. Over time, an improperly functioning intellect
inevitably collects and deposits a vast array of mis-knowledge (yes*) in
the storehouse of the mind’s memory. When this is the case, false words
37
Distinct from error and lying, doubt may be involved in either. Although human
knowledge is uncertain about most things, the human can be certain both that she is alive
and that she wants to be happy precisely because she doubts (see Trin. 15.15.25; Drever
2013, 124–31).
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will be generated for the thinking attention from the storehouse of memory by the willed affirmation of agreement between the thing mis-known
in the memory (yes*) and its pre-linguistic word generated in thinking
attention (yes*). The result is an error in memory and thinking attention
that always includes an ignorance of the mistake attendant to such
errors. Subsequently, even when the intellect functions properly, the
“yes*” of the mis-knowledge in the memory is repeated as a “yes*” in the
mis-knowing of thinking attention. Nothing about this phenomenon yet
constitutes a lie. So far we have considered ignorance that pertains to
knowledge in the memory and error in the processes of thinking that
generates further error and ignorance when thought deposits misknowledge with knowledge in the memory.
The Trinity does not share this problem. Because of divine consubstantiality and simplicity, God’s “Yes” is always “Yes” in God’s Word and
God’s “No” is always “No.” These attributes ensure that there is no falsehood in the persons of the Trinity.
What is God’s knowledge is also his wisdom, and what is his wisdom is also
his being or substance, because in the wonderful simplicity of that nature
. . . being wise is the same as being . . . thus [the Son] knows everything the
Father knows, but his knowing comes to him from the Father just as his
being does. For here knowing and being are one and the same. . . . Hence it
is as though uttering himself that the Father begot the Word . . . [The
Father] would not have uttered himself completely and perfectly if anything less or more were in his Word than in himself. There supremely we
can recognize “yes, yes; no, no.”. . . . And this Word can never have anything
false in it because it unchangeably finds itself exactly as he from who it is
finds himself. (Trin. 15.14.23)

Although the pre-linguistic human word is “something like that Word of
God which is also God, since this one is born of our knowledge as that one
was born of the Father’s,” the human word suffers from falsehood through
ignorance and error whereas God’s Word is always true as a result of divine
omniscience, consubstantiality, and simplicity (Trin. 15.14.24). The Father
knows all things and the Son knows all things that the Father knows, thus
there is no discrepancy in the “yes, yes; no, no” of the immanent Trinity.
This is a model of the properly functioning intellect that human beings had
in the garden and that will be restored in the resurrected elect. In the saeculum, the intellect may undergo healing and renewal but never in this lifetime will it escape error or its miserable necessities.38
38

Augustine offers fascinating consolation to Laurentius about the necessity of error in
the political realm (see ench. 5.17). His counsel is roughly analogous to the contemporaneous discussion of the miserable necessities under which judgment and human action take
place within Varro’s three levels of human society—household, city, and world [domo, civitas/urbis, and orbis] (see civ. 19.5–7).
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LIES: KNOWING AND WILLING FALSE WORDS

Due to the mind’s created limitations of ignorance in combination
with the errors endemic to post-Fall human knowing, the mind generates a great many falsehoods. And yet it is clear that not every falsehood
generated and expressed sensibly constitutes a lie. Sensibly signified
falsehoods may be expressed willingly or unwillingly, and it is primarily
this distinction that differentiates errors from lies in one’s communication with others. False significations that are errors derive not from a
willingness to convey falsehood but from a will that intends to convey
truth about which the intellect happens to be mistaken. Errors are false
significations willingly signified but unknowingly false—the signification
is willed and known whereas the falsehood is unwilled and unknown.
Lies on the other hand are false significations performed willingly and
knowingly. Thus, lying presents a third-order deficiency. Lying is not a
deficiency merely of ignorance, or even of ignorance and intellect, but
also, necessarily, of will. With respect to the lie, it is irrelevant whether
the person really signifies a falsehood (that is, regarding the reality that
obtains in the world); what matters is whether the person intends to signify falsehood (that is, regarding what the agent believes to be true).
Careful attention to this intention pays dividends where interpreting
Augustine is concerned.

4. Conclusion: Lying and Necessity after the Image of God
How then shall we read Augustine’s ethics of lying? What can we say
about the hermeneutics of familiarization and defamiliarization, lying
and killing as analogous or disanalogous acts, and intertextual-canonical
and genetic-historical interpretive methods? From the vantage of De Trinitate 15, there are clear warrants for a genetic-historical reading that
attends closely to developments in Augustine’s moral reasoning regarding the definition of lying, its necessity, and its relation to the image of
God. In the standard interpretation, the “intention to deceive” is one of
two essential elements of Augustine’s definition of lying.39 However, in
Augustine’s earliest exposition of lying, the intention to deceive is not an
essential feature of the definition of a lie, and for this reason jokes are
considered lies in en. Ps. 5. Subsequently, texts from De mendacio to
Contra mendacium repeatedly affirm that “a lie is a false signification
told with an intention to deceive” and, because joking lacks the element
of an “intention to deceive,” Augustine allows it a moral sanction that he
consistently withholds from lying. Significantly, in the texts prior to De
39
See mend. 3.3–5.5; qu. 6.11; c. mend. 12.26, 14.29; and ench. 7.22. As noted above, all
of these are subsequent to en. Ps. 5.
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Trinitate 15, the second word of the “yes, yes; no, no” refers to the external and sensible signification that is either true or false to the knowledge
one has in mind, so to speak, within the rational soul. Finally, in De Trinitate 15, the unprecedented location of both the pre-linguistic word and
the second, sign-assuming word within the rational soul, alters Augustine’s conception of both the lie and its constitutive “intention to deceive”
in important and often-overlooked respects that indicate developments
beyond the standard interpretation.40 Here, a lie is willingly false, but it
lacks the “intention to deceive.”
If Augustine had been following the pattern of his earlier writings on
lying, he would have invoked the “intention to deceive” [fallendi voluntas], defining lying as the knowing selection of a false sign to be assumed
by the second word with an intention to deceive regarding the first word.
However, Augustine asserts only that the second word is willingly and
knowingly false: “When we lie we willfully [volentes] and knowingly
40

Paradigmatically, the first and second words are construed in terms of thought and
speech, respectively, though sensible gestures other than speech are equally signifiers in
Augustine’s account. He takes scriptural references to the heart [cor] and to the mind
[mens] as roughly interchangeable, understanding both as references to the “inner human”
[interior homo] of 2 Corinthians 4:16 (see, ep. Io. tr. 38.10, s. 117, nat. gr. 77). Whereas an
error is a false signification lacking a will to deceive, a lie is a false signification having a
will to deceive. Identifying this distinction helps explain certain differences between the
interpretations of Decosimo, Griffiths, and myself. My account maps Augustine’s distinction
between intellect and will onto his use of the falsa significatio and fallendi voluntas, thereby identifying distinct relations or ‘modes of generation’ that the intellect and will exhibit
in generating a lie. Decosimo and Griffiths effectively collapse knowing and willing into the
mind’s generation of the falsa significatio, assigning the fallendi voluntas to intentions
about the external effects on another’s mind (see Decosimo 2010, 663–64; Griffiths 2004,
27–31). Decosimo and Griffiths both find Augustine puzzling on this point because it is
clear to both that Augustine does not consistently affirm that such effects are necessary to
the lie in the manner that their interpretations of the fallendi voluntas would seem to
require and predict. Griffiths’s response is to assert that Augustine must be mistaken in
asserting the fallendi voluntas is an essential feature of the lie. According to Griffiths, the
fallendi voluntas is typically present, but the falsa significatio suffices for a lie. Decosimo
responds by accepting Augustine’s assertions regarding the necessity of the fallendi voluntas, and (using the same expansive definition of the falsa significatio as Griffiths) argues
that Augustine misjudges cases as lies where they meet the falsa significatio criterion but
clearly fail to satisfy the fallendi voluntas criterion as he interprets it. These apparent
inconsistencies in Augustine’s expositions disappear once one recognizes that what Decosimo and Griffiths attribute to the falsa significatio already includes what Augustine refers
to as fallendi voluntas. So, although my interpretation formally agrees with Decosimo and
disagrees with Griffiths in affirming the fallendi voluntas is essential to the lie, due to
materially different accounts of the fallendi voluntas, my account remains in basic disagreement with both Decosimo and Griffiths. For related reasons, Griffiths’s “duplicitous
signification,” which he uses as a synonym for false signification—“Augustine does sometimes use ‘false’ as shorthand for ‘duplicitous’ ” (Griffiths 2004, 27)—also aggregates the two
essential features of a lie (fallendi voluntas and falsa significatio), and is thus more expansive than Augustine’s falsa significatio.
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[scientes] have a false [falsum] word, where the true word is that we are
lying” (Trin. 15.15.24). The difference is small but key. In De Trinitate
15, the lie takes place within the rational soul itself. Before a word is
outwardly signified, it is already a lie once the mind willingly selects a
signifier knowing that the resultant sign-assuming word is false in relation to the pre-linguistic word. This false word [falsum verbum] is functionally analogous to the previous false signification [falsa significatio].
It must be willed as false, but the previously essential intention to
deceive is no longer essential.41 After numerous writings on lying in
which the fallendi voluntas is repeatedly affirmed as one of two constitutive features of the lie, Augustine drops this feature while explicating
the lie within the rational soul. Instead, the willingly generated false
word in the rational soul is a lie when it is generated for any malevolent
work. And, this makes good sense given the way that Augustine explores
the image of God and the “yes, yes; no, no” within De Trinitate. The novel and pronounced interiority of the lie suggests that something much
more pernicious is at work in De Trinitate’s account of lying than in previous definitions involving the fallendi voluntas.
The lie within the rational soul is sui generis. Willingly and knowingly
generating a false sign-assuming second word about good works is not one
sin among many, or simply the source of all sins of deception, but rather the
genesis of every sin. Having located the origin of sin in a deficient or evil will
(in civ 12.7), Augustine now projects that insight back into the rational soul’s
Trinitarian and Christological dynamics. Lacking the fallendi voluntas, a lie
in the rational soul is knowingly and willingly generated not so much in
order to deceive as it is generated by a rational soul that has already been
deceived and now suffers the evil of that deception (see civ. 11.13, 14.11; ench.
5.17; Trin. 15.16.26). Each lie in the rational soul bears false witness about
the triune God’s true and rightful place as the summum bonum and the rational soul’s immediately subordinate dominion over the creation as the imago
trinitatis, the highest of all created natures. The lie’s active mis-orienting of
will recapitulates the Fall of Adam and of the angels, and thus unites the
rational soul with the founders of the civitas terrena.
Given this more expansive meaning that Augustine attributes to lying—a
willingly false word in the imago trinitatis, the genesis of every sin—he could
hardly consider such a lie morally necessary. Long before this late account of
41

It might be thought, and not without some warrant, that the rational soul’s willing
and knowing generation of this false word is an impotent attempt to deceive the Trinity
who is more intimately present to the rational soul than it is to itself (conf. 3.6.11). Augustine makes no mention here, however, of any attempts to deceive anyone, whether God,
oneself, or others. Admittedly, Augustine’s moral psychology leaves room for interesting
possibilities of self-deception—perhaps even deceiving oneself that God does not see what
takes place in the pre-linguistic processes of the rational soul (see Mathewes 1999).
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lying, the early exposition of Psalm 5:7 presents the sole text in which Augustine allows for an exceptional case of a necessary lie. Noting that Augustine
quickly and explicitly overturned this judgment, the scholarly consensus
regarding Augustine’s absolute prohibition of lying is correct, but only from
the time of De mendacio forward. The Trinitarian and Christological interpretation of the imago trinitatis in terms of two words—one an immanent
procession and one an economic mission, both within the rational soul—lends
even greater support to his repeated claims that lying is never necessary.
After 395, the consistent attribution of non-necessity to lying sets lying apart
from the “necessities” of torture, killing, and war from which Augustine begs
God’s deliverance in De civitate dei 19.42
Thus, lying and killing are morally disanalogous acts according to
Augustine’s moral vision. Whereas killing brings death to the body,
“lying kills the rational soul” (Wisdom 1:11; see also mend. 6, 9, 31, 33).
Our careful reading of Augustine on lying and his conception of the imago trinitatis indicates how he is able to affirm lying’s absolute prohibition
without having to affirm analogous arguments about killing (pace Decosimo and Weaver). Retracing Augustine’s Trinitarian and Christological
account of true words and lies within the rational soul enables us to
understand how Augustine comes to see lying not only as the origin of
the split between the two cities but also as the genesis of every evil
work. Distinct judgments regarding the possible necessity or absolute
prohibition of lying and killing are justified on the grounds that they are
formally disanalogous acts in his moral reasoning.
Finally, from the vantage that De Trinitate 15 affords of developments in Augustine’s ethics of lying, we gain an appreciation for how
competing understandings of his ethics derive from distinct reading
strategies and interpretive premises. Few of Augustine’s readers today
attend to the way that his doctrine of the Trinity and the image of God
inform his moral reasoning about lying. And Griffiths is certainly correct to emphasize the particular theological commitments that underwrite and give shape to an Augustinian prohibition of lying based upon
De Trinitate 15. On the other hand, in those writings from the previous
three and a half decades, during which Augustine repeatedly returns to
the question of lying, his reasoning makes no mention of the image of
God or of Trinitarian analogies to the generation of true and false
words in the rational soul. Thus, if we insist on reading earlier texts in
light of the later De Triniate 15, we threaten to import not-yetdeveloped insights and to distort the moral reasoning on offer. Still, at
any period in Augustine’s development, once we have the theological
42

See civ. 19.5–7. Such miserable necessities warrant Augustine’s echo of the psalmist’s
plea, “Deliver me from my necessities” (Psalm 25:17) as well as other prayers for the
“necessary mercy” [misericordia necessaria] of God (civ. 19.6, 9).
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commitments informing Augustine’s moral reasoning in view, we need
not affirm their details in order to recognize that Augustine’s practices
of reason-giving are intelligibly familiar, much as Bowlin observes. As a
result, the respects in which his moral reasoning requires familiarization and defamiliarization is a function of several variables. Such variables will include, at the very least, which of Augustine’s commitments
we recognize, which ones we share, and which may be anachronistic to
the particular text in view.
We began with some basic questions. What is Augustine’s definition of
lying? Why is lying never necessary whereas killing sometimes is? And,
how does the image of God inform Augustine’s moral reasoning about
lying? In conversation with other interpretations of Augustine, we have
found it necessary to interrogate the implicit assumptions of such questions. Across his corpus, Augustine does not present readers with only
one definition of lying, a single treatment of lying’s necessity, or a consistent mapping vis-
a-vis the image of God. As a result, answering questions about Augustine’s ethics of lying requires that we first seek to
understand Augustine in his historical and moral complexity. Whose
Augustine? Which moral reasoning? At what point in his development?
Augustine’s writings on lying are not univocal, even if the vast
majority align with the standard scholarly interpretation. Augustine’s
earliest and final writings exhibit departures from, and developments
before and after, the canonical account—in their definitions of lying
and its essential features, in affirming lying’s non-necessity, and in the
role played by the image of God in his ethics. Both the definition of a
lie and its constitutive features exhibit development across Augustine’s
writings—from en. Ps. 5, through texts informing the standard interpretation, to the internalization of the image of God in the account of
De Trinitate 15, inflected with Augustine’s Trinitarian and Christological commitments. Likewise, the possible necessity of lying constitutes a
formal similarity to killing in the earliest writings, a necessity that is
subsequently denied in texts that inform the standard interpretation,
and whose arguments are only bolstered by theological expositions of
lying in the rational soul. Retracing Augustine’s ethics of lying and
explaining manifestly divergent judgments such as these necessitates
careful attention to developments in his moral reasoning and to the
image of God therein.43

43

I am grateful to the Ethics Colloquium at Villanova University and to the 2015 Augustine and Politics Colloquium for their thoughtful engagements with earlier drafts of this
article.
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Abbreviations

LATIN TITLE

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Answer to Skeptics
Against Lying
The City of God
The Confessions
Miscellany of Eighty-Three Questions

ep.
ep. Io. tr.
Gn. litt.
Gn. litt. inp.

Contra Academicos
Contra mendacium
De civitate Dei
Confessiones
De diversis quaestionibus
octoginta tribus
Enarrationes in Psalmos
Enchiridion de fide et spe et
caritate
Epistulae
In epistulam Iohannis tractatus
De Genesi ad litteram
De Genesi ad litteram inperfectus

lib. arb.
mend.
op. mon.
persev.
qu.
s.
s. Dom. mon.
spir. et litt.
Trin.
vera rel.

De libero arbitrio
De mendacio
De opere monachorum
De dono perseverantiae
Quaestiones in Heptateuchum
Sermones
De sermone Domini in monte
De spiritu et litteram
De Trinitate
De vera religione

Acad.
c. mend
civ.
conf.
div. qu.
en. Ps.
ench.

Expositions of the Psalms
Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity
Letters
Homilies on the First Epistle of John
The Literal Meaning of Genesis
Unfinished Literal Commentary
on Genesis
The Freedom of the Will
Lying
The Works of Monks
The Gift of Perseverance
Questions Concerning the Heptateuch
Sermons
The Sermon on the Mount
The Spirit and the Letter
The Trinity
True Religion

*All abbreviations for Augustine’s texts follow Pollmann and Ottem 2013, xiii–xvi.
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